# Rokh Solis

## Analysis of an information operation targeting the March 2026 municipal elections

Technical report - June 2026

Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security (SGDSN)

VIGINUM - Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference

**Translator's note.** This is an English reading translation of the French report published by VIGINUM on 11 June 2026. It preserves the report's claims, qualifications and confidence language. Names, usernames, domains, identifiers and dates are unchanged. Screenshot images, network diagrams and the full archive-link apparatus remain in the original French PDF; their captions and substantive explanatory notes are translated here. The original is authoritative.

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# Executive summary

In March 2026, VIGINUM detected a new information operation pattern (French acronym: **MOI**), which it named **Rokh Solis**. It centred on a network of websites and social-media accounts intended to denigrate the political party La France Insoumise (LFI), as well as several of its candidates in the municipal elections of 15 and 22 March 2026. VIGINUM's investigations show that the campaign conducted through this MOI meets the criteria for foreign digital interference.

Four of the websites concerned — `blogdesophie.com`, `delogupourpalestine.com`, `piquemalzero.com` and `lalternative2026.com` — share technical characteristics, including the same IP address, registration date and image metadata. They also received coordinated amplification on TikTok, Instagram, X and Facebook from accounts displaying several indicators of inauthenticity. Analysis of `lalternative2026.com` and accounts associated with Rokh Solis also connected two further websites to the same ecosystem: `forsane-alizza.eu`, which expressed support for `lalternative2026.com`, and `rcn-france.org`, which purported to warn against it.

The ecosystem's distinctly hostile editorial line formed part of a broader strategy to discredit La France Insoumise and denigrate its candidates and MPs Sébastien DELOGU, François PIQUEMAL and David GUIRAUD in Marseille, Toulouse and Roubaix respectively. A second strand of the operation — `rcn-france.org` and `forsane-alizza.eu` — set two supposedly opposing ideologies against each other: on one side, a conservative, identitarian and sovereigntist movement; on the other, a sham radical-Islamist group. The apparent aim was to polarise French public debate by instrumentalising the Muslim community.

Beyond the digital sphere, a TikTok account associated with `rcn-france.org` promoted activity in physical locations in Paris. A similar operation, highlighting posters pasted up in Marseille, was promoted by the X account `@LeBlogdeSophie`. Despite the variety of digital assets, numerous attempts at artificial amplification, and the spread of foreign digital-interference activity across several platforms, Rokh Solis achieved only limited online visibility before the 2026 municipal elections.

On the involvement of a foreign actor, VIGINUM identified several technical indicators of foreign origin: Hebrew characters in the metadata of one website; the TikTok account `@renaissancecatholiquefr` being located in Israel; and the sharing of hashtags and posts associated with the pro-Israel organisation ELNET. These indicate, at minimum, the indirect involvement of a foreign actor.

Several technical findings directed VIGINUM's investigation towards an Israeli private entity named **Blackcore**, whose digital-influence strategies resemble those observed in the information campaigns conducted through Rokh Solis. Investigation of the company revealed a collection of tools for artificially amplifying social-media activity within an ecosystem of Israeli private cybersecurity entities. At this stage, the breadth of that environment prevents precise identification and assessment of the exact role of the operators behind Rokh Solis.

# 1. Narratives and manifestly inaccurate or misleading content

The operators of Rokh Solis appear to have used two distinct narrative strategies. The first sought to denigrate La France Insoumise and certain LFI candidates in the 2026 municipal elections. The second sought to polarise online public debate around divisive issues, particularly by accusing LFI of Muslim communalism. These strategies produced several ecosystems of digital assets whose deployment, behaviour and amplification displayed numerous indicators of coordination and inauthenticity (see Section 2).

## 1.1 Denigration of LFI and its candidates

Analysis of the editorial line of the various digital assets used by the Rokh Solis operators reveals their objectives: to damage the reputation of LFI and certain candidates, and to polarise national public debate by instrumentalising the Muslim community.

First, the publication on `lalternative2026.com` of a list of La France Insoumise candidates and affiliated candidates formed part of a general strategy to discredit the party. This approach relied in particular on accusing LFI of communalism, presented as a defining feature of the policies the party supposedly intended to promote locally and nationally.

Second, targeted attacks were conducted against particular LFI municipal candidates to damage their reputations and reinforce the broader criticism of the party. Through manifestly inaccurate or misleading narratives alleging criminal conduct, the operation's principal digital assets directly targeted three LFI candidates: Sébastien DELOGU, François PIQUEMAL and David GUIRAUD, standing respectively in Marseille, Toulouse and Roubaix.

| Rokh Solis digital assets | Target | Narrative |
|---|---|---|
| `blogdesophie.com`; X and Facebook accounts named "Le Blog de Sophie" | Sébastien DELOGU | Allegation of rape. |
| `delogupourpalestine.com` | Sébastien DELOGU | A letter purportedly written by the candidate offering a calendar containing photographs of himself, some allegedly nude, with the proceeds supposedly intended to provide direct support to the people of Gaza. |
| Two Facebook pages and `piquemalzero.com` | François PIQUEMAL | Allegations of paedophilia, violence and support for Hamas terrorist acts; impersonation of a child-protection charity. |
| Two Facebook pages | David GUIRAUD | Attacks on his pro-Palestinian positions regarding the Israel–Hamas conflict. |

## 1.2 Polarisation of online public debate through the instrumentalisation of the Muslim community

To lend credibility to `lalternative2026.com`, which also indirectly targeted LFI, Rokh Solis's operators created two distinct digital ecosystems with opposing narratives.

The first centred on an alleged project named "L'Alternative 2026", represented by the domain `lalternative2026.com`. It promoted a communalist political programme supposedly serving the Muslim population in the municipal elections, and listed LFI candidates portrayed as sympathetic to that programme. The site advocated such measures as establishing a religious legal system and making it easier to wear religious symbols. Its stated objective was "to help Muslim citizens identify, in each city, the candidate who will best represent their interests". Placing these principles alongside a list of LFI or LFI-affiliated candidates insidiously implied collusion between the party and the project's communalist demands.

Another part of the same ecosystem promoted "L'Alternative 2026". The operators created digital assets using the name of the now-dissolved radical-Islamist group **Forsane Alizza**. These

assets disseminated narratives inspired by that group's Salafist ideology and praised the initiative for France's Muslim community promoted by lalternative2026.com.

> Forsane Alizza, or "Knights of Pride", was a radical-Islamist group that presented itself as an association from 2010. It comprised around fifteen people active in France from 2010 to 2012. Its activities were principally online and in physical demonstrations, focusing mainly on antisemitic and anti-blasphemy themes.

Constructing this communalist posture then facilitated a second, antagonistic ecosystem. Centred on a supposed organisation named "Renaissance Catholique Nationale", with a sovereigntist, identitarian, Catholic and conservative editorial line, it spread alarmist messaging about the "decline of France" and warned of "the rise of radical Islamism", notably by denouncing lalternative2026.com.

This narrative dialectic was probably intended to generate online engagement, increase the visibility of both spheres and ultimately polarise digital public debate over the place of the Muslim community in French society.

# 2. A deliberate, large-scale system of artificial or automated dissemination

Between 9 and 19 February 2026, VIGINUM detected the creation of four websites designed to target LFI and certain candidates during the 2026 municipal elections. The sites shared technical characteristics that support, with high confidence, the assessment that they formed a single ecosystem, potentially created by the same operator (see Annexes 5.1 and 5.2): blogdesophie.com, delogupourpalestine.com, piquemalzero.com and lalternative2026.com.

VIGINUM established in particular that blogdesophie.com and lalternative2026.com shared several technical elements:

- Both domains were registered on 9 February 2026 and hosted on the same IP address, 198.177.120[.]188.
- Images generated with the same large language model, Gemini, were uploaded to both sites.
- One image on blogdesophie.com had the same author name, "usman latif", as eight images on lalternative2026.com and delogupourpalestine.com. All were produced using Canva.

The sites' deployment was accompanied by the creation of Facebook pages and accounts on X, Instagram and TikTok.

VIGINUM also detected two other associated sites: rcn-france.com and forsane-alizza.eu. The first purported to be the public-facing website of a conservative and sovereigntist French political movement, notably denouncing the project supposedly represented by lalternative2026.com. The second presented itself as the return of a French radical-Islamist group and praised lalternative2026.com's claimed initiative on behalf of France's Muslim community.

Despite numerous attempts at artificial amplification, the visibility of these digital assets remained low.

## 2.1 Targeting LFI candidates for mayor of Marseille, Toulouse and Roubaix

### 2.1.1 blogdesophie.com

The domain blogdesophie.com was created on 9 February 2026 and protected by Cloudflare's anonymisation service. The single-page website presented itself as the blog of an alleged former colleague of Sébastien DELOGU who accused him of rape and claimed to be breaking "the

silence". It linked to an X account and a Facebook page, both of which included the website in their biography and shared common hashtags, photographs of leaflets pasted up in Marseille, and a video testimony from the alleged victim. The testimony stated that "Sophie" was a pseudonym used out of fear of retaliation by the MP for Bouches-du-Rhône's seventh constituency.

**Figure caption:** Screenshot of the probable desktop of the `blogdesophie.com` administrator.

A screenshot of the site administrator's desktop appears to have been uploaded accidentally. It revealed a number of tools used by at least one campaign operator and a date format not ordinarily used in France: `2026/2/12`.

The Facebook page "Le Blog de Sophie" was created on 19 February 2026. Between then and 5 March it published seven posts, including a video on 27 February in which a woman, shown with her back to the camera and with an altered voice, described the alleged rape.

VIGINUM also detected nine photographs of posters apparently pasted up in Marseille. The posters displayed a QR code linking to `blogdesophie.com`. Five locations were geolocated: 67 Cours Julien; 39 Cours Julien near L'Espace Julien; 10 rue Pierre Mouren; 396 rue d'Endoume; and the tunnel beneath Boulevard Charles Livon. Their graphic design resembled a leaflet promoted by `@renaissancecatholiquefr` on TikTok on 9 February 2026 (see Section 2.2.2).

The Facebook page also published other material probably generated by generative AI and a screenshot of an alleged conversation with Sébastien DELOGU. Several posts appear to have been amplified artificially and in coordination by a network of 500 Facebook pages and accounts displaying indicators of inauthenticity. The first post, for example, received likes from 500 Facebook pages on the day it was created; many of those pages had no followers and described themselves as beauty pages.

The X account `@LeBlogdeSophie0` was created on 6 March 2025 and renamed on 18 February 2026. From 28 February to 4 March 2026 it distributed the same content as the Facebook page. On three occasions it addressed Sébastien DELOGU directly by replying to his posts.

### 2.1.2 `delogupourpalestine.com`

The domain `delogupourpalestine.com`, registered on 19 February 2026, used Cloudflare and the same WordPress template as `blogdesophie.com`, visible for example on the sites' author-profile pages.

VIGINUM identified a Facebook page named "Qui est Sébastien Delogu ?" ("Who is Sébastien Delogu?"), also created on 9 February 2026, which helped distribute content targeting the MP. Unlike other pages in the operation, its descriptive information contained errors: the email address, purported Instagram and Telegram accounts, and Facebook URL username all misspelled the candidate's surname as "Delgou".

**Figure caption:** `blogdesophie.com` on the left; `delogupourpalestine.com` on the right; alongside them, the Facebook page "Qui est Sébastien Delogu ?".

### 2.1.3 `piquemalzero.com`

The domain `piquemalzero.com`, registered on 11 February 2026, targeted François PIQUEMAL, LFI candidate for mayor of Toulouse and MP for Haute-Garonne's fourth constituency. It was hosted by Namecheap, used Cloudflare, and ran WordPress with the same `hello-elementor 3.4.6` template as the three other sites identified by VIGINUM.

VIGINUM assesses that the site was connected to a Facebook page named "Je suis François Piquemal et je ne suis rien." ("I am François Piquemal and I am nothing"), which used the hashtag `#piquemalcestmal`. Also created on 9 February 2026, the page published numerous items targeting the LFI candidate. On 24 February it shared a link to `piquemalzero.com` with the

message: “We are not alone. A new website dares to ask the questions that few dare ask. It seems that many share the same concerns.”

The hashtag was also disseminated on TikTok by `@drole_230` and on Instagram by the corresponding account `@elections_municipales_2026`.

VIGINUM also detected at least 21 inauthentic Facebook accounts posting the same link to `piquemalzero.com` in comments beneath a post on François PIQUEMAL’s official page. Every account posted exactly the same formatted link, `********piquemalzero.com`, between 00:01 and 00:02 on 6 March 2026.

### 2.1.4 Impersonation of the charity “Enfance et Partage” on Facebook

The Facebook page `@EnfanceetPartageorg`, created in February 2026, impersonated **Enfance et Partage**, a French child-protection charity established in 1977. The genuine organisation had operated a Facebook page since 2012 and had more than 10,000 followers; the impersonating page was followed by 1,900 accounts displaying inauthentic characteristics.

Between 15 and 22 February, the fake page’s first posts were exact copies of posts from the charity’s genuine account. From 22 February it began publishing original material alleging that senior political and religious figures who assaulted minors benefited from a form of immunity. From 25 to 27 February, VIGINUM identified three posts misleadingly reporting a supposed judicial investigation into François PIQUEMAL for assaulting a minor while he was a teacher at Lycée du Mirail in Toulouse.

Those posts received no reactions, as was the case with the page’s other content through its last observed activity on 3 March. VIGINUM observed no onward dissemination of the misleading allegations about PIQUEMAL on Facebook or other platforms, despite possible pre-positioning on X through the empty account `@EnfanceP16039`.

The page’s creation date and narrative, together with its joining several Facebook groups at the same time as multiple inauthentic accounts belonging to the MOI, led VIGINUM to attribute `@EnfanceetPartageorg` to Rokh Solis with high confidence.

### 2.1.5 “The hidden truth about David Guiraud”

VIGINUM also detected two Facebook pages targeting David GUIRAUD, LFI candidate for mayor of Roubaix and MP for Nord’s eighth constituency.

One page, created in 2022, was later renamed “Toute la vérité sur David Guiraud” (“The whole truth about David Guiraud”). The second was created on 13 February 2026 and named “Guiraud Est Zéro. Les faits que David Guiraud ne veut pas que vous sachiez” (“Guiraud is zero: the facts David Guiraud does not want you to know”). Using the same method deployed against François PIQUEMAL, the pages published content criticising GUIRAUD’s pro-Palestinian positions.

Several technical features connect the pages to Rokh Solis with high confidence. They used identical profile and banner images. Interactions with their posts involved the same network of inauthentic accounts used for the other Facebook pages described above (see Section 2.1.6). One page also displayed the email address `info@guiraudestzero[.]com`, echoing the wording used against PIQUEMAL. VIGINUM did not identify a website associated with that address.

### 2.1.6 Inauthentic Facebook amplifiers potentially involved in other foreign digital-interference operations

The following analysis focuses on the three main pages identified by VIGINUM: “Le Blog de Sophie”, “Qui est Sébastien Delogu ?” and “Je suis François Piquemal et je ne suis rien.” Common amplifiers were also detected on the pages targeting David GUIRAUD, but an article published by Le Monde on 9 March 2026 exposed part of the Rokh Solis campaign and prompted the

rapid removal of most avatars at the operation's centre. Technical elements found through inauthentic Facebook accounts also indicate the former presence of equivalent Instagram, X and TikTok accounts, now removed or suspended, which were probably intended to amplify Rokh Solis assets.

Around the three Facebook pages accompanying the first three websites, VIGINUM identified the artificial mobilisation of numerous accounts, used chiefly to post comments. A video published on "Qui est Sébastien Delogu ?" on 16 February 2026, for example, still displayed 18 comments during the investigation. Nine were posted at exactly 12:40 on 21 February by accounts with similar characteristics: predominantly male profiles created or modified in February 2026 and usually located in the United States.

The same commenting activity extended to "Le Blog de Sophie" and "Je suis François Piquemal et je ne suis rien." Across 338 comments, VIGINUM identified 138 unique users. Three commented on all three pages, while 48 commented on at least two. The timing showed strong coordination during February. Although the pages otherwise had no visibility, more than one hundred comments were placed on "Qui est Sébastien Delogu ?" within a very short period around 21 February.

Within the cluster of 138 accounts, five also reshared posts from the pages targeting PIQUEMAL and DELOGU. These amplifiers displayed the same traits: creation on 11 or 12 February 2026; presentation as male individuals, such as "Kendrick Castro" and "Hanley Dolton"; and a stated location in a US city such as Chicago.

VIGINUM identified another apparently inauthentic Facebook cluster intended to share content targeting LFI candidates into Facebook groups. At least 39 accounts took part; at least 20 were later suspended or removed. The remaining active accounts shared the following characteristics:

- AI-generated profile pictures;
- common French names such as Claire Martin, Elise Martin, Etienne Martin, Sophie Dupont and Luc Dupont;
- identical posting or resharing histories for some accounts — for example "Lea Leclerc" and "Camila Savard" both reshared December 2025 videos from "ELNET France" and posts from the CNEF (National Council of Evangelicals of France) and "Christ Apostolic Church France" pages;
- corresponding accounts on Instagram and/or X.

Most groups in which these accounts positioned themselves addressed French-speaking audiences and French local or national politics, often with oppositional or satirical editorial lines. On 7 September 2025, 23 of the 39 accounts joined "Militant de Droite"; 20 joined "@Combat Républicain 2027"; 20 joined "Le Canard Enchaîné Libre"; and 18 joined "info citoyenne pour demain".

Most targeted groups were joined in autumn 2025, although some were joined in January and February 2026. On 23 February, for example, the accounts joined "Arabes à Toulouse DZ" and "Les Musulmans de Marseille", indicating that the operators were seeking local audiences while deploying the campaigns against PIQUEMAL and DELOGU.

Several findings indicate that some accounts may have been used in earlier campaigns, while others had already changed names, possibly in preparation for future operations. The account formerly named "Maxime Meireles", which joined six groups on 7 September 2025, later became "Romi Shushan" and listed Tel Aviv–Jaffa as its location. "Shirel Matana", previously "Amélie Charpentier", was renamed in March 2026 and located itself in Rishon LeZion, Israel. Another account, formerly "Manon Berger", joined five identified groups on 7–8 September 2025 and later presented itself as "Forsane Alizza" (see Section 2.2.3).

Some of the 39 accounts also appear to have been used in earlier information campaigns targeting the United States, including the November 2025 New York mayoral election. In October 2025, four accounts joined "#WalkAway Campaign", four joined "This is Woodhaven, NYC", and

six joined “Brockton Political Central”. In an apparently related pattern, “Julie Simon” and “Théo Blanc” reshared posts from Democratic mayoral candidate Andrew CUOMO on 6 and 7 October 2025.

VIGINUM further identified a linked cluster with identical characteristics targeting audiences in Angola. Forty-eight accounts still active at the time of reporting displayed traits similar to the preceding cluster:

- AI-generated photographs;
- Portuguese-sounding names such as Maria Sousa, Paulo Carvalho and Luisa Pereira;
- common reposts and coordinated likes or comments on the same material.

These accounts coordinated the amplification of content produced by the Angolan government or promoting the **Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola** (MPLA, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola). Like accounts targeting the French municipal elections, they coordinated their entry into multiple Angolan Facebook groups, including pro-MPLA groups.

VIGINUM found several indications of overlap between the French-speaking accounts used against the municipal elections and the Portuguese-speaking accounts targeting Angola:

- On four occasions, accounts in the “Angolan” cluster interacted with accounts targeting France. “Diogo Pereira”, “Miguel Correia”, “Luzia Andrade” and “Paulo Nunes” received likes from “Romi Shushan” and “Shirel Matana”. Other reactions also suggested a further cluster portraying people of Ukrainian origin.
- “Kodjo Mensah” had previously been named “Ana Dos Santos” and might be the Facebook equivalent of the X account `@its_anasantos`.
- “Carlos Fernandes” had previously been named “Alex Dupuis”.
- Several comments beneath official Angolan government communications were posted in French rather than Portuguese, suggesting possible translation errors.

VIGINUM therefore established a connection between accounts active in operations targeting the French municipal elections and accounts amplifying Angolan government posts. Technical elements discussed in Section 3.3 support the hypothesis that a single operator may have been behind both information operations.

## 2.2 Staging a conflict between an alleged radical-Islamist ecosystem and a supposed sovereigntist association

While investigating the campaign against LFI candidates, VIGINUM detected the simultaneous deployment of digital assets designed to oppose one another through narratives instrumentalising France’s Muslim community. The campaign’s sites and avatars simulated a divide between an alleged Islamist-separatist segment and a sham identitarian, conservative movement.

### 2.2.1 `lalternative2026.com`

The domain `lalternative2026.com` was registered on 9 February 2026, its real IP address obscured by Cloudflare, and hosted at Namecheap.

It presented itself as the website of “L’Alternative 2026”, a purported “citizens’ initiative launched ahead of the March 2026 municipal elections”, whose objective was “to help Muslim citizens identify, in each city, the candidate who will best represent their interests”.

The site mapped 108 left-wing candidates, mainly LFI members or candidates on lists supported by the party. It portrayed them as able to facilitate the integration of “Muslim life” in France if elected. Its illustrations and logo were generated using Gemini, as were some illustrations on `blogdesophie.com`.

In February 2026, as part of a search-engine optimisation strategy, Rokh Solis operators paid the online content-placement service ABNewswire.com to place an article promoting the site on legitimate outlets, including the Associated Press website and OpenPR. VIGINUM observed

only five social-media shares of lalternative2026.com, notably by @renaissancecatholiquefr on TikTok on 24 February and the "Forsane Alizza" Facebook page on 2 March.

### 2.2.2 rcn-france.org: a fifth site warning about lalternative2026.com

The TikTok account @renaissancecatholiquefr was created on 12 September 2024 and used mainly to distribute anti-Muslim videos. Its description linked to rcn-france.com, registered on 26 March 2025, which redirected to rcn-france.org. The latter had technical characteristics distinct from the four websites above.

Created on 25 March 2025 and using Cloudflare, rcn-france.org purported to represent a conservative and sovereigntist French political movement named **Renaissance Catholique Nationale**. The movement had no prior existence and appeared to take inspiration from the name of Renaissance Catholique, a genuine conservative Catholic movement founded in 1988 to "disseminate Christian values".

The site linked to a Jotform associated with a French telephone number about which VIGINUM found no information, a since-suspended Instagram account @renaissance.catholique, and the TikTok account above.

VIGINUM identified two actions in physical locations in Paris. A video published by @renaissancecatholiquefr on 9 February 2026 showed a person holding a flag bearing the organisation's logo outside the Sorbonne at Place du Panthéon. The same video showed another person, geolocated at 141 rue de Javel, holding a leaflet bearing the Renaissance Catholique Nationale logo. Like those promoted by blogdesophie.com, the leaflet contained a QR code, in this case linking to @renaissancecatholiquefr.

On 24 February the TikTok account posted a video warning of a "new website" that "claims to help voters find their way through the 2026 French municipal elections". It showed lalternative2026.com, providing an indirect link to the ecosystem of the first four Rokh Solis sites.

> From September 2024 to August 2025, @renaissancecatholiquefr promoted the pro-Israel hashtag #TheWestIsNext and Islamophobic narratives to an English-speaking audience. It was subsequently renamed and redirected towards sovereigntist narratives targeting a French-speaking audience.

### 2.2.3 forsane-alizza.eu: a sixth site connected to the lalternative2026.com ecosystem

The "Forsane Alizza" Facebook group shared lalternative2026.com on 2 March 2026. The page was probably purchased by a Rokh Solis operator: it had been created on 22 December 2022 but changed its name on 2 March 2026.

VIGINUM detected two other pages also named "Forsane Alizza", each displaying the description: "The game is not over. We are here to change France." One was a community page created on 17 March 2017 and renamed on 27 October 2025. The other had been active since at least 2025 and was formerly named "Manon Berger". It remained associated with the X account @manon_bergers, which belonged to a cluster amplifying @agirensemblefr on X (see Section 3.1).

Google results preserved traces of an older "Forsane Alizza" page, later suspended or deactivated by the operators, which promoted forsane-alizza.eu. The domain was registered on 14 September 2025 on an IP address located in Sweden, 80.78.18[.]115, and initially contained only one image. By 21 October 2025, links to instagram.com/forsanealizza and facebook.com/forsanealizzafr had been added.

On 13 October 2025, in a method identical to the coordinated posting of piquemalzero.com on François PIQUEMAL's official Facebook account, links to forsane-alizza.eu were placed in comments beneath a post on the official Facebook page of Julien ODOUL, an Rassemblement National MP and regional councillor.

Between 13:04 and 13:18, VIGINUM counted 39 inauthentic users, each posting one comment. They all appeared as profiles supposedly of Vietnamese origin. The behaviour of eight accounts suggested automation: all eight reposted the same content on their own profile on 13 October. The post may have been an automation test against material published by another page, "AAA Number 2", which appeared to exist solely for that purpose. Its posts from 24 September to 30 October 2024 were labelled as tests with an action and date, such as "react 1 30-10". After a year of inactivity, the page resumed similar behaviour from 12 to 30 October 2025.

This amplification manoeuvre occurred a few days after staff and elected representatives of the Rassemblement National group in the National Assembly received disturbing WhatsApp messages, sent to their personal telephone numbers and signed "Forsane Alizza", as reported by Atlantico on 8 October 2025.

Sent from a British number, the message repeated the narrative on `forsane-alizza.eu`. It announced the alleged return of the radical-Islamist group "to fight and defend the rights of Muslim communities", while accusing Rassemblement National representatives of trying "to silence Muslim voices in France and Europe".

# 3. Involvement of a foreign actor

VIGINUM's investigation of the digital assets comprising Rokh Solis identified several technical elements supporting the hypothesis that a foreign actor was involved. The indicators of foreign origin appeared both in the operation's digital infrastructure and on social-media platforms, including its dissemination patterns and attempts to amplify online content.

## 3.1 Inauthentic amplifiers shared with a pro-Israel organisation

The X account `@LeBlogdeSophie0` displayed several inauthentic characteristics. Of its 416 followers, 403 were created on 4 March 2026 and 401 of those had no followers. On 5 March, the account displayed 416 followers; after a probable platform suspension wave, it had only 13 on 8 March.

Nine remaining followers belonged to a network of inauthentic X accounts whose activity was devoted exclusively to amplifying French-language publications from the pro-Israel organisation **ELNET** and `@agirensemblefr`. These accounts used AI-generated images and displayed inconsistencies between the language of their earliest and latest posts. Most changed their username in August 2025, as did `@renaissancecatholiquefr`, and had links to one of the inauthentic Facebook clusters discussed in Section 2.1.6.

Analysis identified 17 accounts in the same cluster. They also posted replies beneath a Sud Radio post about `lalternative2026.com`: two reshared that website's URL in comments, while another posted a screenshot of a "Forsane Alizza" Facebook post. The screenshot showed that `@its_anasantos` used an English-language version of Facebook.

The X account `@LeaaaLeclerc` had a profile resembling the Facebook profile `@lea.leclerc51`, including the same profile and cover photographs. While the X account amplified material connected to "Le Blog de Sophie", the Facebook account shared a post from the page targeting François PIQUEMAL on 19 February 2026, providing an additional technical link between the operations.

The small number of comments beneath posts from `@drole_230` and `@renaissancecatholiquefr` were made by around ten accounts that had liked the same posts from `@agir_ensemble_`, `@justefrançais`, `@drole_230` and `@renaissancecatholiquefr`. Across X, TikTok and Facebook, Rokh Solis content therefore appears to have been supported by interconnected networks of inauthentic accounts already used to amplify ELNET-related publications.

> Agir Ensemble was launched by ELNET after the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks in Israel.

## 3.2 Technical indicators of foreign origin

Open-source data from the Rokh Solis websites revealed several indicators of foreign origin, confirming at minimum the indirect involvement of a foreign actor. Technical analysis of `lalternative2026.com` metadata found Hebrew characters in certain `.png` filenames.

**Figure caption:** Hebrew characters present in `lalternative2026.com` metadata.

VIGINUM also identified in the metadata of `forsane-alizza.eu` a Canva user believed to be located in Israel and whose brand name contained Hebrew characters. The Canva account, apparently created on 14 September 2025, used the details `username: dolipart`, `brand: BAGy77qLSTo`, and a brand display name meaning “the Dolipart team”.

The TikTok account `@renaissancecatholiquefr` contained location indicators placing it in Israel and changed its name on 3 August 2025. Between 29 November 2024 and 18 June 2025, it disseminated dozens of alarming English-language, anti-Muslim videos depicting terrorist attacks on European soil. All used `#TheWestIsNext` or `#TheWestIsNow` and mobilisation appeals promoted by pro-Israel circles after 7 October 2023.

Although the account appears to have changed names between creation and this campaign, audio files still bore its former name, `@IrelandRealNews`. Google searches using its old TikTok posts also revealed now-removed or suspended Facebook and Instagram accounts apparently involved in distributing `#TheWestIsNext` and `#TheWestIsNow` to English-speaking audiences from late 2024 to June 2025.

For example, a search for wording used in an old post — “Is London going down? Is this our future? What do you guys think? #uklondon2030 #thewestisNOW” — returned the Instagram account `@trueirishvoice`. Although no longer accessible, it appeared to have a same-named TikTok equivalent, also located in Israel. This suggests that Rokh Solis operators previously targeted other audiences, notably in Ireland and England.

The other TikTok accounts connected to Rokh Solis, `@elections_municipales` and `@justefrancais`, were located in the United Kingdom. This supports the hypothesis that a foreign actor reused accounts involved in pro-Israel information campaigns targeting several countries, including the UK.

## 3.3 An Israeli company probably behind the campaigns

VIGINUM identified an Israeli influence company named **Blackcore**. Reporting by Reuters, Libération and Haaretz corroborated the finding. Investigation characterised a digital infrastructure connected to this pseudo-company that offered services for artificial amplification and inauthentic information operations.

Blackcore, however, appeared to sit within an ecosystem of numerous Israeli cyber-sector companies. At the time of the report, this prevented VIGINUM from determining with sufficient confidence the identity and precise scope of the private company behind Rokh Solis. VIGINUM also found no evidence establishing the identity or origin of any clients that may have purchased its services.

### 3.3.1 Blackcore: an Israeli entity without identified legal status whose strategies resemble the observed campaigns

Very little open-source information existed about Blackcore. VIGINUM could not verify its legal status and believed it was not registered in Israel’s company registry. Nevertheless, `blackcore.online` was registered on 22 August 2025, coinciding with the activation of certain Rokh Solis digital assets, including username changes by inauthentic amplifiers on X.

Blackcore’s website described it as supplying influence, security and technology solutions to governments. Its LinkedIn account, `@officialblackcore`, had a single post from October 2025,

with 32 reactions from a network of inauthentic accounts (see Section 3.3.3). Both the website and LinkedIn account were removed after press reporting in May 2026.

Several subdomains were associated with `blackcore.online`:

- `angola-plan.blackcore.online` referred to training provided to the Angolan government in February 2026, suggesting that Blackcore dealt directly with that government. VIGINUM hypothesised a link between this work and the inauthentic network amplifying Angolan government material discussed in Section 2.1.6. Web-infrastructure links in Section 3.3.2 supported the hypothesis.
- `demo.blackcore.online` described the company's influence strategy. Blackcore claimed a large network of inauthentic Facebook, Instagram and TikTok accounts — 1,600 avatars in total. It also claimed to base influence campaigns on mass personal messaging and infiltration of communities, including Facebook groups, matching tactics seen in Rokh Solis.
- `full-report.blackcore.online` displayed a Blackcore logo whose metadata contained the Hebrew name **Nati MASOOD**. A Facebook profile belonging to Nati Eliyahu MASOOD, who presented himself as an Israeli citizen, may correspond to the metadata. He appeared to be a developer of websites and automation tools.

### 3.3.2 An infrastructure revealing a broad range of artificial-amplification tools connected to the municipal-election operations

The Blackcore subdomain `proposals.blackcore.online` was hosted at `94.237.57[.]56`. Three domains were placed on that address: `balckcore.com` [sic], `electric-marinade.com` and `omrisystems.com`. The latter two led to a substantial list of subdomains apparently used solely as interfaces for artificial-amplification tools.

- `fb-search.omrisystems.com` appeared to offer an interface that used an LLM to find the most relevant keywords for a query, then automatically identify major Facebook groups connected to those keywords.
- `avatar-data-generator.electric-marinade.com` and `avatar-data-generator.omrisystems.com` were probably avatar-management applications. The latter page title, "Login – Avatar Data Generator by Galacticos AI", suggested that Israeli company **Galacticos AI** may have developed them. The same technical indicator revealed another cyber entity, **Iron Mind**, through `avatar-data-generator.dev.iron-mind.ai`.

Investigation of `iron-mind.ai` led to **Iron Mind AB**, apparently a software-development company registered in Sweden by Nir DOBICKY on 30 October 2025. DOBICKY, who presented himself as Israeli and was born in April 1980, also headed companies registered in the UK and Sweden, including Rocketpod Technologies LTD and Blade Marketing, also named Social Worx LTD. The businesses specialised in online-influence services, principally automation tools, including for LinkedIn. LinkedIn was also affected by artificial-amplification activity attributable to Blackcore (see Section 3.3.3).

Investigation of the infrastructure around `electric-marinade.com` also found traces of another campaign targeting a pro-Palestinian audience. Its mail server, `smtp.electric-marinade.com`, at `5.22.213[.]198`, was linked to `sadaqahpalestine.com`. The latter, now inactive, promoted a sham charity named "Sadaqah Palestine". Associated X, Facebook and Instagram accounts were identified; only the X account remained active.

Analysis of `@sadaqahpalestin` on X revealed a group of accounts amplifying all its posts through comments. Their characteristics closely matched those of accounts commenting on Facebook content targeting DELOGU, PIQUEMAL and GUIRAUD:

- artificial comments generated through an LLM;
- the use of several languages — English, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Arabic;
- creation dates and posting rates consistent with automated operation;
- male and female personas, generally young, using English-sounding names, some with AI-generated profile photographs.

The same accounts commented on posts by Nir DOBICKY's X account, @niroknox. Although they mainly amplified lifestyle and cryptocurrency content, they were also used for specific operations such as "Sadaqah Palestine" and, more recently, the Scottish elections.

Between 6 January and 8 May 2026, the account of Scotland's First Minister John SWINNEY and that of his party, the Scottish National Party, appear to have been targeted on four occasions by coordinated English-language comments from these accounts. VIGINUM identified at least 256 accounts distributing 1,400 comments, principally against posts by @JohnSwinney (652), @theSNP (338) and @ScotGovFM (112).

The logo on @sadaqahpalestin led through a Fiverr review to the profile "paullussac", which appears to have commissioned its creation. Other reviews by that profile concerned AI-generated videos intended for Togolese or Gabonese audiences and the creation of a website for an Israel-based company, twostepinnovations.com. That domain was hosted on the same IP addresses as blackcore.online.

A telephone number on sadaqahpalestine.com led to the TikTok account @deepdiveafrica, created on 10 April 2025 and located in Israel. One post promoted the humanitarian opening of an Israeli hospital in Togo; another displayed a "Politizando Angola" logo.

This led VIGINUM to an active Instagram account, @politilizando_angola, created in January 2026, and an inactive Facebook page named "Politizando Angola". The Facebook page had joined the same groups as the inauthentic accounts targeting Angola. Another TikTok account, @africa_real_news, had an almost identical posting feed to @deepdiveafrica and was also located in Israel.

The technical links between these operations and Blackcore's web infrastructure, together with the amplification methods detected, connected them to Rokh Solis and the foreign digital-interference operations analysed around the French municipal elections.

Investigation of 94.237.57[.]56 also revealed several open server ports, including port 3002, which had an associated API. Server configuration linked electric-marinade.com, omrisystems.com and possibly sni.ai, suggested by the sni-staging subdomain. Blackcore, Electric Marinade and Omri Systems did not appear to have legal existence, unlike Galacticos AI, SNI and Iron Mind.

Among the few online references to Galacticos AI, VIGINUM found a 21 September 2025 article from the international-business law firm **Afik & Co**, located at 103 Hachashmonaim, Tel Aviv, and founded by Doron AFIK. Photographs from a "diplomatic cocktail" at the firm showed Yigal UNNA, apparently attending as a Galacticos AI representative.

**Galacticos LTD** was registered at the same address, with Doron AFIK reportedly among its directors. Its domain, galacticos.ai, was registered on 17 April 2024 by Guy GEYOR through **SNI**, also based at the same address. Photographs on LinkedIn showed GEYOR with AFIK on at least two occasions in 2025. Nir DOBICKY also appeared repeatedly in posts from Afik & Co's Instagram account, and AFIK, GEYOR and DOBICKY followed one another on Instagram.

At least two LinkedIn posts — one connected to Afik & Co and one to Blackcore — received artificial amplification from the same group of roughly thirty apparently inauthentic accounts (see Annex 5.6).

### 3.3.3 Links to an Israeli business angel

Research into these entities showed Blackcore to be part of a broad ecosystem of Israeli cyber companies and entities. **Yigal UNNA** appeared central: he was formerly director-general of the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) and had previous experience in Unit 8200 of the Israel Defense Forces and in Shin Bet.

> Unit 8200 is an Israeli military-intelligence branch specialising in signals intelligence. Shin Bet is Israel's domestic intelligence service.

UNNA now headed **Cygun LTD**, an incubator for Israeli cyber companies that he founded on 10 October 2022. cygun.co.il described his background and the company's objectives, which consisted principally of providing cyber support to government and private-sector bodies.

Cygun conducted consultancy and other projects through a network that included the Israeli investment fund Iron Nation. It also supported numerous Israeli start-ups, among them Galacticos AI. Most of the start-ups displayed alongside Galacticos AI had Yigal UNNA in their governing bodies.

# 4. Harm to the fundamental interests of the Nation

Given its malicious activity, Rokh Solis was deliberately used in an attempt to distort the information available to citizens during municipal voting and was therefore capable of harming the fundamental interests of the Nation.

On the one hand, blogdesophie.com, delogupourpalestine.com and piquemalzero.com sought to denigrate LFI and three of its candidates by instrumentalising policy proposals and making allegations of crimes and offences.

On the other hand, the digital assets @renaissancecatholiquefr on TikTok, rcn-france.org, lalternative2026.com and the "Forsane Alizza" Facebook group sought to polarise online public debate by instrumentalising the Muslim community. Nevertheless, despite numerous attempts at artificial amplification, Rokh Solis's digital assets achieved only very limited online visibility after deployment.

In light of these factors and the operation's complexity, longevity and scope, VIGINUM considers Rokh Solis to meet the criteria for foreign digital interference. The Service will continue its investigations to characterise further the nature of the operators behind the MOI.

# 5. Annexes

The original annex pages are reproduced after this English text so that account identifiers, archive references and technical diagrams remain available in their published form. The translations below provide the English titles and table keys.

## 5.1 Timeline of the deployment of Rokh Solis campaigns

The source diagram plots the activation of websites, social-media pages and amplifier clusters from 2024 through the March 2026 municipal election period. It visually connects the earlier #TheWestIsNext activity, group infiltration during 2025, deployment of the six principal websites and associated pages, the coordinated commenting waves in February and March 2026, and the removal or renaming of assets after press exposure.

## 5.2 Diagram of the Rokh Solis web infrastructure

The source diagram maps shared hosting, domains, WordPress templates, Cloudflare name servers, metadata, Canva/Gemini artefacts, mail addresses and linked social-media accounts. It illustrates the technical connections supporting VIGINUM's high-confidence assessment that the assets formed one coordinated ecosystem.

## 5.3 Lists of inauthentic Meta accounts and targeted groups

**Facebook accounts targeting the 2026 municipal elections**

**Column key:**

| French heading | English |
|---|---|
| Nom | Name |
| ID | Account ID |
| Actif | Active |
| Autres comptes | Other accounts |
| Archive | Archived copy |
| Oui / Non | Yes / No |

The table contains 39 listed identities, including Théo Blanc, Julie Simon, Romi Shushan / Maxime Meireles, Shirel Matana / Amélie Charpentier, Manon Berger / Forsane Alizza, Lea Leclerc, the fake “Guiraud Est Zéro” and “Enfance et Partage” pages, and associated Instagram and X accounts.

#### Facebook groups joined by those accounts

**Column key:** `Groupe` = Group; `Date d’intégration` = Date joined; `Archive` = Archived copy.

The listed groups include French political groups, local Muslim and Arab community groups, US political and local-community groups, Canadian political groups, Christian and evangelical groups, and several African civic or political communities. Dates range from September 2024 to February 2026.

#### Facebook and Instagram accounts involved in an information operation in Angola

**Column key:** `Nom` = Name; `ID` = Account ID; `Autres comptes` = Other accounts; `Archive` = Archived copy.

The table lists 48 accounts, including aliases that changed identity — Carlos Fernandes / Alex Dupuis, Kodjo Mensah / Ana Dos Santos, Joseph Adu / Isabel Franco and Soykat Hasan / Lucas Neto — together with related Instagram profiles and archive links.

#### Facebook groups joined by the Angola-targeting accounts

**Column key:** `Groupe` = Group; `Date d’intégration` = Date joined; `Archive` = Archived copy.

The groups include `POLITICA PARA TODOS`, `Angola`, `Angola em Movimento`, `ANGOLANOS UNIDOS POR UMA ANGOLA MELHOR`, several MPLA groups, `VOZ DA DIASPORA`, and other Angolan, African and international groups. Dates range from May 2024 to February 2026.

## 5.4 X-account cluster involved in the municipal-election information campaign

**Column key:**

| French heading | English |
|---|---|
| Compte | Account |
| Date de création | Creation date |
| Date de modification du nom d’utilisateur | Date username changed |
| Partage Agir Ensemble et/ou ELNET | Shared Agir Ensemble and/or ELNET material |
| Suit le blog de Sophie | Follows “Le Blog de Sophie” |
| Commente la publication de Sud Radio | Commented on the Sud Radio post |
| Localisation du compte | Account location |
| Version X | X client/version |
| Inconnue | Unknown |

| French heading | English |
|---|---|
| Royaume-Uni | United Kingdom |
| Suisse | Switzerland |

The table lists 17 accounts. The first cluster largely changed usernames in August 2025, shared Agir Ensemble or ELNET content, and included nine accounts following “Le Blog de Sophie”. Three May 2025 accounts commented on the Sud Radio post. Locations shown by X included the UK, Europe, Switzerland and France.

### 5.5 Diagram of Blackcore infrastructure

The source diagram maps Blackcore, Electric Marinade, Omri Systems, SNI, Iron Mind, Galacticos AI and connected people, companies, infrastructure, automation tools and influence assets. It also shows technical paths to operations involving Sadaqah Palestine, Angola, Scotland, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, X and LinkedIn.

### 5.6 LinkedIn account cluster involved in amplifying Blackcore’s post

**Column key:**

| French heading | English |
|---|---|
| Nom | Name |
| Réaction à la publication de Blackcore | Reacted to Blackcore’s post |
| Réaction à la publication d’Afik & Co. | Reacted to Afik & Co’s post |
| Localisation | Location |
| Nombre d’abonnés | Number of followers |
| oui / non | yes / no |

The table lists 30 accounts from locations including Singapore, the Philippines, Spain, the United States, Argentina, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Scotland and Lithuania. All reacted to Blackcore’s post; 25 also reacted to Afik & Co’s post.

## About VIGINUM

Created on 13 July 2021 and attached to the SGDSN, the Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (**VIGINUM**) exists to protect online public debate affecting the fundamental interests of the Nation.

This technical and operational government service detects and characterises information-manipulation campaigns on digital platforms that involve foreign actors seeking to harm France and its interests.

**Original report:** SGDSN/VIGINUM, Rokh Solis: Analyse d’un mode opératoire informationnel ayant ciblé les élections municipales de mars 2026, technical report, June 2026.
https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/viginum/Publications/20260611_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Rapport-technique_Rokh-Solis.pdf

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# 5. ANNEXES

## 5.1. Chronologie de déploiement des campagnes du MOI *Rokh Solis*



## 5.2. Schéma de l'infrastructure *web* du MOI *Rokh Solis*



## 5.3. Listes des comptes inauthentiques sur *Meta* et des groupes ciblés

- Liste des comptes inauthentiques sur *Facebook* ayant ciblé les élections municipales 2026 :

| Nom | ID | Actif | Autres comptes | Archive |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Théo Blanc** | 100009837391284 | Oui | *instagram.com/the0blanc*<br>*x.com/Theo0Blanc* | https://archive.ph/DjYUV |
| **Julie Simon** | 100008980603303 | Oui | *instagram.com/julie_12simon* | https://archive.ph/p1X5u |
| **Elise Martin** | | Non | | |
| **Adrien Dubois** | | Non | *x.com/Adrienubois* | |
| **Camille Bouvet** | 100000966362066 | Oui | *instagram.com/camibouvet* | https://archive.ph/UJMcP |
| **Romi Shushan / Maxime Meireles** | 100002001680594 | Oui | *instagram.com/romishushan446* | http://archive.ph/q059Z |
| **Shirel Matana / Amélie Charpentier** | 1197189204 | Oui | *x.com/AmeliCharpente* | https://archive.ph/5BYtq |
| **Alexandre Moreau** | | Non | *x.com/AlexandrMoreau* | |
| **Camila Savard / Todd Shaw** | 100084410421939 | Oui | *instagram.com/fitness.camila* | https://archive.ph/2dnnW |
| **Dimitri Davin / Frederick Nikolai** | 100005496518952 | Oui | *instagram.com/dimitri_davin* | https://archive.ph/2q9AR |
| **Julien Garcia** | | Non | *x.com/JulienGGarcia* | |
| **Thomas Germain** | | Non | | |
| **Eloise Rousseau** | | Non | | |
| **Manon Berger / Forsane Alizza** | 100068076475246 | Oui | *x.com/manon_bergers* | |
| **Céliné Aimé** | | Non | *x.com/Celinejtaime* | |
| **Amélie Fontaine** | 100052425981422 | Oui | *instagram.com/amelieeefontaine* | https://archive.ph/asiGO |
| **Antoine Delaunay** | | Non | | |
| **Claire Bernard** | | Non | *x.com/ClairebBernard* | |
| **Luc Dupont** | | Non | | |
| **Giti Yee** | 61585985705539 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/Cyhvu |
| **Etienne Martin** | | Non | | |
| **Margaux Faure** | | Non | | |
| **Lea Leclerc** | 100025205192191 | Oui | *x.com/LeaaaLeclerc*<br>*instagram.com/lea_6leclerc* | https://archive.ph/Lmd75 |
| **Thomas Durand** | | Non | | |
| **Margarida Lopes** | 61585780155956 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/aGpLB |
| **Renato Vieira** | 61585805924593 | Oui | | https//archive.ph/OtNsG |
| **Adolfo Martins** | 61586021854055 | Oui | | |
| **Fernanda Gaspar** | 61586216963960 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/xl0pB |
| **Guiraud Est Zéro.** | 61586021854055 | Non | | https://archive.ph/gx2bb |
| **Enfance et Partage** | 61587863747582 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/BPnwJ |
| **Hugo Roche** | | Non | | |
| **Claire Perrin** | | Non | | |
| **Ngân Hale 68** | 100075968945688 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/tt5rb |
| **Briceño Arteaga Steven** | | Non | | |
| **Claire Martin** | | Oui | *instagram.com/clair3martin* | https://archive.ph/iaJMF |
| **Alice Thomas** | 61580030243617 | Oui | | https://archive.ph/JJsKi |
| **Olivia Reyes** | | Non | | |
| **Sophie Dupont** | 100009534210453 | Oui | *instagram.com/sophiesodupont* | https://archive.ph/bufVO |
| **Jimena Quiles** | 100012527208960 | Oui | *instagram.com/jimena.quiles1* | https://archive.ph/dPQsK |

- Liste des Groupes *Facebook* intégrés par les comptes cités *supra :*

| Groupe | Date d'intégration | Archive |
|---|---|---|
| **@Combat Républicain 2027** | 7 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/kWMBO |
| **GILET JAUNE (Officiel)** | 19 et 20 février 2026 | https://archive.ph/hTKra |
| **Groupe de Morannes sur Sarthes -Daumeray Participation Citoyenne** | 7 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/MSRHC |
| **GAUCHE NON POUTINISTE NON PRO HAMAS** | 7 ou 8 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/rS9F7 |
| **Libres débats entre militants ouvriers…** | 2 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/CRGZz |
| **Info citoyenne pour demain** | 7 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/pL4bD |
| **Le Canard Enchaîné Libre** | 7 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/1K5sA |
| **Militants de Droite** | 3 et 7 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/F6omb |
| **Nous ne voulons + de la France en AFRIQUE** | 19 février 2026 | https://archive.ph/Q6G8J |
| **Arabes à Toulouse DZ** | 23 février 2026 | facebook.com/groups/2966279619258 71/user/61585985705539 |
| **Les Musulmans de Marseille** | 23 février 2026 | facebook.com/groups/1109495699125734/user/61585780155956/ |
| **#WalkAway Campaign** | 8 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/Zvi7d |
| **Brockton Political Central** | Octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/6bgbn |
| **Canadian Politics on Facebook** | Du 30 décembre 2025 au 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/9rJ05 ; https://archive.ph/crCxd |
| **Bunge La Nyangores (B.L.N)** | 8 ocotbre 2025 | https://archive.ph/naAqP |
| **Desi in Chicago, Illinois** | 30 septembre 2024 | https://archive.ph/5Gxnc |
| **For rent in Hopkinsville/Christian county, KY** | 3 janvier 2025 | https://archive.ph/q9dJM |
| **Cars For Sale Kentucky** | 3 janvier 2025 | https://archive.ph/xgH0j |
| **Democracy Advocate Initiative** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/X5bdZ |
| **Gnat Youth** | 8 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/Yl8Pf ; https://archive.ph/bHGAS |
| **L anD in Paris France** | 20 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/Thjzp |
| **Jobs in Paris (and rest of France)** | 20 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/wte7M |
| **Mastrick, Sheddocksley & Summerhill Community Council** | 8 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/dmQnQ |
| **World Evangelism Missions** | 1er novembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/0VQ6X |
| **This is Woodhaven, NYC** | 12 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/jzhwO |
| **Ozone Park Residents Association** | 8 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/k29ou |
| **Morris Park In The Bronx** | 8 octobre 2025 | https://archive.ph/FLTQJ |
| **Grow As A Keyboardist** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/Kge17 ; https://archive.ph/pWlcb |
| **JEUNESSE EN MISSION** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/DNFpy |
| **CHRETIENS DES ASSEMBLEES DE DIEU DU BURKINA FASO** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/sLA9U |
| **Gwoup priyè pou Kris** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/gfE1A |
| **MAISONS LAFFITE D'AVANT ET DE DEMAIN** | 1er janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/ymz9a |

- Liste des comptes inauthentiques sur *Facebook* et *Instagram* impliqués dans une opération informationnelle en Angola :

| Nom | ID | Autres comptes | Archive |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Ana Costa** | 100065275154182 | *instagram.com/ana.costa71°* | https://archive.ph/hdH0O |
| **Ana Fernandes** | 61566985475011 | | https://archive.ph/gdk7Z |
| **Ana Silva** | 61578598422959 | | https://archive.ph/tWZYA |
| **Beatriz Sousa** | 61583790852561 | | https://archive.ph/7rEBj |
| **Carla Neves** | 61577987549046 | | https://archive.ph/yo5tJ |
| **Carlos Fernandes** | 61567345971248 | | https://archive.ph/n7qly |
| **Carlos Fernandes/Alex Dupuis** | 61553237953183 | | https://archive.ph/xnH41 |
| **Carlos Silva** | 100091783742493 | | https://archive.ph/IS6dB |
| **Claudia Gomes** | 61579254197392 | | https://archive.ph/pM21w |
| **Diogo Pereira** | 100091682196038 | | https://archive.ph/lbb6L |
| **Elda Campos** | 61579335971978 | | https://archive.ph/NWvyc |
| **Elisa Rocha** | 61579797809650 | | https://archive.ph/3CeZm |
| **Elsa Moreira** | 61566923018785 | | https://archive.ph/LC8BE |
| **Francisco Moreira** | 100091760943581 | | https://archive.ph/rzDYy |
| **Hugo Gomes** | 61579414906699 | | https://archive.ph/TsxF1 |
| **Isabel Novais** | 100091830510088 | | https://archive.ph/DFM98 |
| **Isabel Vicente** | 100091784311620 | | https://archive.ph/kg0TH |
| **Jorge Campos** | 61578789192522 | *instagram.com/jorgecamposa17* | https://archive.ph/YMO0y |
| **José Machado** | 61566878321334 | | https://archive.ph/CSo7d |
| **José Silva** | 61578754215908 | | https://archive.ph/dnyvu |
| **Joseph Adu/Isabel Franco** | 100091734470667 | | https://archive.ph/leI2X |
| **Julia Martins** | 61579817459526 | | https://archive.ph/BhJ4o |
| **Julia Silva** | 61578979766787 | | https://archive.ph/qHeeA |
| **Kauan Borges** | 100026779241205 | *instagram.com/kauanborges.h76* | https://archive.ph/QnORT |
| **Kiala Manuel Fernandes** | 61567523203140 | | https://archive.ph/W8bcn |
| **Kodjo Mensah/Ana Dos Santos** | 61555847610347 | | https://archive.ph/zZCdi |
| **Luisa Pereira** | 61578843424485 | | https://archive.ph/stPbC |
| **Luzia Andrade** | 61579389609782 | | Luzia Andrade \| Facebook |
| **Maria Ferreira** | 100012961032657 | *instagram.com/mar.ferreira43* | https://archive.ph/xDkAE |
| **Maria Sousa** | 61553750844339 | | https://archive.ph/2MG7P |
| **Mariana Costa** | 61579907332260 | | https://archive.ph/vaBlI |
| **Mariana Pereira** | 100091798291763 | | https://archive.ph/6HIEY |
| **Marta Castro** | 61578975732597 | | https://archive.ph/LpC6Y |
| **Marta Dias** | 61579720739286 | | https://archive.ph/pXiif |
| **Mateus Silva** | 61568633517176 | | https://archive.ph/yeMJm |
| **Miguel Correia** | 61578910990796 | | https://archive.ph/FJqx2 |
| **Nancy Kato** | 61567551098312 | | https://archive.ph/pLxuX |
| **Patricia Domingos** | 100004287882617 | | https://archive.ph/nbzgI |
| **Paulo Carvalho** | 61579038305054 | | https://archive.ph/LNnSn |
| **Paulo Costa** | 61579286237069 | | https://archive.ph/zcp20 |
| **Paulo Nunes** | 61579629507371 | | https://archive.ph/uy9c0 |
| **Pedro Costa** | 61579609774855 | | https://archive.ph/d0lJP |
| **Pedro Moreira** | 61578786035910 | | https://archive.ph/GNMcd |
| **Rafael Almeida** | 100091825800193 | | https://archive.ph/rA3TN |
| **Raquel Lourenço** | 61568282440959 | | https://archive.ph/S035N |
| **Rita Santos** | 61578854823330 | | https://archive.ph/tGnVb |
| **Sofia Costa** | 100091774052498 | | https://archive.ph/xfzPf |
| **Soykat Hasan/Lucas Neto** | 100091777472324 | | https://archive.ph/XksEr |

- Liste des Groupes *Facebook* intégrés par les comptes cités *supra :*

| Groupe | Date d'intégration | Archive |
|---|---|---|
| **POLITICA PARA TODOS** | 30 mai et 2 juin 2025 | https://archive.ph/E0spE<br>https://archive.ph/vjMe3 |
| **Angola** | 27 septembre 2025 ; 10, 11, 17 et 22 novembre 2025, 24 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/9xDYA |
| **Angola em Movimento** | 12-13 décembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/stNrN |
| **ANGOLA : POVOS & LINGUAS** | 20 mai et 2 juin 2025 | https://archive.ph/Tsaol ;<br>https://archive.ph/xn1S3 |
| **ANGOLA. O PAIS** | 25 mai 2025 | https://archive.ph/4jZng |
| **ANGOLANOS UNIDOS POR UMA ANGOLA MELHOR** | 20 mai 2025 ; 13 décembre 2025 ; 25 janvier 2026 ; 1er et 6 février 2026 | https://archive.ph/IRi0G<br>https://archive.ph/WpT9H<br>https://archive.ph/tlRDU<br>https://archive.ph/rlutX<br>http://archive.ph/dCD4d |
| **DENUNCIA PUBLICA ANGOLA** | 31 mai et 3 juin 2025 | https://archive.ph/GnXvE |
| **INFORMAR COM VERDADE** | 2 novembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/0suub |
| **MPLA – CUBANGO** | 17, 18, 22 et 23 novembre 2025 ; 24 et 25 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/wHhk3<br>https://archive.ph/beAYt<br>https://archive.ph/huy2D<br>https://archive.ph/LixuL<br>https://archive.ph/e6vWT |
| **MPLA – FACEBOOK DO CAP DE LISBOA** | 2, 18, 23 et 24 novembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/hbPYh<br>https://archive.ph/8xOOn |
| **MPLA RUMA A 2027 E A VITORIA E CERTA** | 2, 17, 18, 22, 23 et 29 novembre 2025 ; 24 et 26 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/YQ8DM<br>https://archive.ph/fQrTe<br>https://archive.ph/j05V0<br>https://archive.ph/UdaH4 |
| **Ordem dos amigos contabilistas de Angola** | 31 mai et 3 juin 2024 | https://archive.ph/zM9mb<br>https://archive.ph/xHPkN |
| **OS JURISTAS E ESTUDIANTES DO CURSO DE DIREITO/INTERACCAO TOTAL** | 2 novembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/dhNYU |
| **VIANA= MPLA,OMA,JMPLA « MELHORAR O QUE ESTA BEM, CORRIGIR O QUE ESTA MAL »** | 26 novembre 2025 ; 13 et 14 décembre 2025 ; 25 et 26 janvier 2026 ; 2 et 12 février 2026 | https://archive.ph/W2qFN<br>https://archive.ph/0apHS<br>https://archive.ph/2fJJg<br>https://archive.ph/5nILl<br>https://archive.ph/ISnn4 |
| **VOZ DA DIASPORA** | 20, 22 et 26 novembre 2025 ; 25 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/L0mp9<br>https://archive.ph/pu02S<br>https://archive.ph/2ZFFB<br>https://archive.ph/wND7J |
| **As Mulheres Mais Lindas de Angola** | 11 septembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/oqXQL |
| **Dr Abel Chivukuvuku Para Presidente em 2027. EU APOIO !** | 8 novembre 2025 | https://archive.ph/SeWiT |
| **African History Group** | 5 janvier 2026 | https://archive.ph/rgdOu |
| **Трансерфинг реальности** | 26 août 2025 | https://archive.ph/agUy2 |

## 5.4. Liste du cluster de comptes *X* impliqués dans la campagne informationnelle visant les élections municipales

| Compte | Date de Création | Date de modification du nom d'utilisateur | Partage *Agir Ensemble* et/ou *ELNET* | Suit *le blog de Sophie* | Commente la publication de *Sud Radio* | Localisation du compte | Version *X* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Etienne3Martin*** | Avril 2019 | Août 2025 | X | | | Royaume-Uni | *Web* |
| ***JulienGGarcia*** | Octobre 2012 | Août 2025 | X | | | Royaume-Uni | *Web* |
| ***EscofilPericles*** | Juin 2014 | Inconnue | X | X | X | Europe | *Web* |
| ***Adrienubois*** | Septembre 2015 | Août 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***AlexandrMoreau*** | Mars 2022 | Août 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***manon_bergers*** | Février 2012 | Février 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***Theo0Blanc*** | Mars 2014 | Août 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***AmeliCharpente*** | Février 2013 | Août 2025 | X | X | | Royaume-Uni | *Web* |
| ***LeaaaLeclerc*** | Janvier 2015 | Août 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***Celinejtaime*** | Septembre 2012 | Février 2025 | X | X | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***LucasgGirard*** | Janvier 2014 | Août 2025 | X | | | Suisse | App Store |
| ***ClairebBernard*** | Mars 2015 | Août 2025 | X | | | Europe | *Web* |
| ***Gabholland_*** | Mai 2025 | Mai 2025 | | | X | Europe | *Web* |
| ***its_anasantos*** | Mai 2025 | Mai 2025 | | | X | Europe | *Web* |
| ***reevaw_*** | Mai 2025 | Mai 2025 | | | X | Europe | *Web* |
| ***ErnestEnchelom*** | Août 2025 | Août 2025 | | X | | France | *Web* |

## 5.5. Schéma de l'infrastructure de *Blackcore*



## 5.6. Liste du cluster de comptes *LinkedIn* impliqués dans l'amplification de la publication de *Blackcore*

| Nom | Réaction à la publication de Blackcore | Réaction à la publication d'Afik & CO. | Localisation | Nombre d'abonnés |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Laurie Tang** | oui | oui | Singapour | 3 353 |
| **Mike Thest** | oui | oui | Cebu, Philippines | 588 |
| **Mario Giacobo** | oui | oui | Madrid, Espagne | 3 275 |
| **Vanessa Valkova** | oui | oui | New York, États-Unis | 8 621 |
| **José Luis Rivero** | oui | oui | Madrid, Espagne | 10 047 |
| **Pablo Mark** | oui | oui | Buenos Aires, Argentine | 2 197 |
| **Joseph Robinson** | oui | non | New York, États-Unis | 12 706 |
| **Ellen Smith** | oui | oui | San Francisco, États-Unis | 556 |
| **Martina A.** | oui | oui | Padoue, Italie | 27 651 |
| **Ted Wijnen** | oui | oui | Utrecht, Pays-Bas | 2 606 |
| **Silvia Borralho** | oui | oui | Lisbonne, Portugal | 5 893 |
| **Beny Dorsey** | oui | non | Ecosse | |
| **Catherine Wiesel** | oui | oui | Torcy, France | 1 168 |
| **Milena Mineo** | oui | oui | Milan, Italie | 814 |
| **Licinio Gaspar** | oui | oui | Lisbonne, Portugal | 3 233 |
| **Jordan Daley** | oui | oui | Exton, États-Unis | 1 817 |
| **Miguel Duarte Pereira** | oui | oui | Porto, Portugal | 3 277 |
| **Rich Odonnel** | oui | oui | Spring, États-Unis | 2 216 |
| **Ronald Thomas** | oui | oui | New York, États-Unis | 516 |
| **Sander van den Berg** | oui | oui | Amsterdam, Pays-Bas | 8 092 |
| **Maria José Bravo** | oui | oui | Montijo, Portugal | 7 048 |
| **Adriana Minotto** | oui | oui | Milan, Italie | 4 056 |
| **Jon Tavarez** | oui | oui | Tampa Bay, États-Unis | 10 366 |
| **Herman Boontje** | oui | oui | Rotterdam, Pays-Bas | 757 |
| **Carla Valério** | oui | oui | Lisbonne, Portugal | 4 479 |
| **Konstantin Frolov** | oui | non | Lituanie | 8 606 |
| **Andrea Gatti** | oui | oui | Milan, Italie | 4 376 |
| **Ruben De Beus** | oui | oui | Ede, Pays-Bas | 1 246 |
| **David HTL** | oui | non | Paris, France | 521 |
| **Marco Valente** | oui | oui | Montijo, Portugal | 2 538 |